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[Excerpt] In the 1920s, Americans, both borrowers and lenders, discovered new ways to finance consumer 
credit, and, of course, it was only the beginning. Debt was everywhere, and its ubiquity was made possible 
by changes in finance, manufacturing, and law that had occurred after the First World War. High interest 
on consumer loans had long been illegal in the U.S., but around World War I, progressive reformers, 
seeking to drive out loan sharks, pushed states across the country to raise the legal interest rate. Now 
able to lend money legally, at rates which could be profitable, new consumer finance industries sprung up 
overnight. The legal changes coincided with a new generation of cars and electrical appliances that were 
both expensive and mass produced. The installment credit allowed manufacturers to sell these new 
wonders at a volume, and consumers could afford them because of the easy monthly payments. What 
ultimately made all this lending possible was that lenders could now, for the first time, resell their debt. 
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Introduction: Everything Old Is New Again 
“Dick” and “Jane” Smith met shortly after they had both moved to the city, 
coming upon each other in the park on a sunny Sunday afternoon. Romantic sparks 
flew, declarations of love were exchanged, rings and vows followed—and then they 
began their search for a home of their own where they would start their new life 
together. 
Dick hadn’t gone to college, but he had recently found work in a new industry 
that was sweeping the country. The company’s IPO a few years back had been one of 
the most successful in history and he was going to help manufacture the killer product 
that, as one of his executives had said in his firm’s annual report, had “given us all 
something worth working for.” Dick and Jane, like the rest of the country, were caught 
up in the heady optimism of what newspaper pundits said was a New Era. 
Flush with love and short on cash, the Smiths went their local bank to find out if 
they could get a mortgage. The home that they wanted was expensive, like all houses 
these days, but the Smiths knew that houses were a good investment. Prices had gone 
through the roof in the past few years and real estate was always a sure thing. “You 
can’t make more land!” Jane remembered her father always saying. 
At the bank, the Smiths met with a well dressed mortgage officer. Looking over 
the application, the mortgage officer asked them far fewer questions than they had 
expected: how long had he had his job, how long had they lived at their address, how 
much did he make? After a few calculations, the mortgage officer somberly informed 
Dick and Jane that an “amortized” mortgage—one in which they repaid against both 
interest and principal every month—would not get them the house they wanted. Dick’s 
income was just not enough to cover it. 
But the Smiths didn’t have to worry. The bank offered another, better option 
that most smart people were using these days: an interest only “balloon” mortgage. 
With a balloon mortgage, Dick and Jane could buy the house immediately, sleeping 
soundly with the knowledge that their household income had nowhere to go but up, 
right alongside real estate values. And, when the time for bigger payments finally came 
a few years down the road, they could simply refinance with a new loan that was just as 
affordable as the first. Why pay off the house when they would probably just sell it in a 
few years, anyhow? 
In fact they would have to refinance since the loan was only for four years, but 
that wouldn’t be a problem at all. The mortgage officer explained, in confident tones, 
that refinancing would never be a problem again because banks had started issuing 
bonds to finance customers’ mortgages. Investors were always looking for a good deal, 
and real estate was a sure thing. 
Four years! Dick would almost certainly move up in his burgeoning high tech 
industry in that time. Jane already envisioned a bigger space, the envy of her sisters. The 
couple looked at each other knowingly, trusting in the guidance of the mortgage officer, 
and signed the papers that he offered to them. Dick and Jane thought they couldn’t go 
wrong. They were in the middle of one of the greatest housing booms in American 
history, with home values seeming to double every time they turned around. 
Developers couldn’t buy houses fast enough. Smart buyers would act fast, they thought, 
before home prices rose even more. There was no risk, only reward. 
Dick and Jane moved into their house, and Dick went to work. But within the 
year, orders began to slow down. He didn’t lose his job, but his overtime got cut. Then it 
hit. The big stock market crash didn’t hit him, but it spilled over. Everywhere confidence 
in the economy slid. The newspaper stopped using “New Era” except in derision. And 
then, just as he began to look to refinance his house, everything fell apart. 
House values began to plummet, balloon mortgages became impossible to 
refinance, foreclosures in their neighborhood were, seemingly overnight, more common 
than rare. Like the stock speculators who borrowed on the margin, millions of 
Americans just like Dick and Jane were living on the margin of their household incomes 
so that they could “own” their homes. All too late, Dick and Jane realized that they were 
speculating just like those hucksters on the Street. 
Dick walked into the S&L only to find that the mortgage officer had been sacked. 
His replacement, considerably less friendly than his predecessor, told him in no 
uncertain terms that he had to come up with the principal or he would be foreclosed on. 
Dick sputtered. He had done what the man in the suit had told him. How had this 
happened? Before turning his back and returning to his work, the new guy at the bank 
told Dick that investors no longer wanted to buy real estate bonds. The well was dry. 
Without mortgage funds to lend, the bank had to collect. 
When the bank repossessed their dream house, Dick and Jane didn’t have even 
the most basic of personal luxuries—no iPod, no netbook, not even a hand me down 
BlackBerry. Desperate as they were, they literally couldn’t even give these things up in 
one last fruitless effort to save their home. After all, none of these things would be 
invented until the next century. 
It was 1932. 
Dick had gotten his manufacturing job at General Motors in Flint only a few years 
earlier. Like Jane, Dick was part of a broad population shift from the country to the city 
in the early part of the century that tipped the census, for the first time, in favor of 
urban America. Moving to the city, Dick and Jane did what so many of their generation 
did, they borrowed. 
As investors fled the mortgage markets, the U.S. housing industry fell apart—not 
initially from unemployment, but from a credit crisis. By 1933, the national foreclosure 
rate had reached 1,000 homes a day. After four years of withdrawals that withered even 
the sturdiest of mortgage funds, in 1933 the U.S. housing industry was effectively dead, 
having contracted to just 1/10 what it had been only a few years before. A third of all 
American families who qualified for “relief” at the height of the Great Depression landed 
there by losing a construction job. Dick didn’t work in construction, but his business, 
building automobiles, was hit just as hard. 
The 1920s were not only similar to today in terms of young love and mortgage 
debt, but for all forms of debt. In fact, it was the very spread of automobile debt that 
gave Dick his job in the first place. Automobile finance emerged after World War I as 
one of the hottest industries, spreading its methods in just a few years to nearly all 
other household durables. Vacuum cleaners, washing machines, and oil burners could 
all be had on the installment plan. The American savings rate dropped precipitously and 
nearly all of it went into installment credit. 
Then, as now, critics of debt predicted economic catastrophe and railed against 
moral decline. The young couple’s choices were expressed most damningly by one of 
America’s great industrialists, the chief competitor of Dick’s employer GM, a man who 
by his popularization of the automobile had perhaps done more than any other single 
person to put us in debt—Henry Ford. While Ford may have pushed cars, he never 
pushed debt. Ford so loathed the sapping of freedom that debt represented for him that 
for most of the 1920s he refused to sell his cars on financing plans, and in the process 
nearly bankrupted Ford Motor Company. His hostility to finance, coupling an anti 
Semitic hostility to Jewish bankers and a mechanic’s hostility to anyone who didn’t make 
anything, hobbled the company. That Dick could get a job at General Motors, which 
believed in debt wholeheartedly, is largely a testament to Ford’s hostility to consumer 
credit. 
In the 1920s, Americans, both borrowers and lenders, discovered new ways to 
finance consumer credit, and, of course, it was only the beginning. Debt was 
everywhere, and its ubiquity was made possible by changes in finance, manufacturing, 
and law that had occurred after the First World War. High interest on consumer loans 
had long been illegal in the U.S., but around World War I, progressive reformers, seeking 
to drive out loan sharks, pushed states across the country to raise the legal interest rate. 
Now able to lend money legally, at rates which could be profitable, new consumer 
finance industries sprung up overnight. The legal changes coincided with a new 
generation of cars and electrical appliances that were both expensive and mass 
produced. The installment credit allowed manufacturers to sell these new wonders at a 
volume, and consumers could afford them because of the easy monthly payments. 
What ultimately made all this lending possible was that lenders could now, for the first 
time, resell their debt. 
Networks of finance stood behind each consumer purchase. When Dick bought 
his first car, the dealer had him sign some papers. Dick agreed to pay for the car over 24 
months and to pay some additional fees, but that was it. Dick never knew where the 
money came from, and if he wondered at all he probably thought it came from the 
dealer. But the dealer took that agreement and sold it, the next day, to the General 
Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC). The dealer didn’t have the capital to finance 
all his customers, but GMAC did. GMAC could issue bonds in the market or use its own 
profits to finance its dealers. As networks developed for all forms of debt—mortgages, 
cars, charge—consumers found that credit became cheaper and easier to use. Retailers 
and financiers used credit to drive their sales and their profits. Some networks emerged 
from the private sector, like car financing, while others emerged from the federal 
government, like mortgages. Wherever they came from, the new networks of debt 
made possible this consumer utopia. But when those networks failed, as with the resale 
of mortgage bonds during the Great Depression, credit could just as quickly turn 
dystopian. 
This picture could have hung in any small late nineteenth century shop—maybe 
a grocer, maybe a hardware store—anybody that didn’t want to give more credit to his 
customers. While cash loans were illegal, credit in the nineteenth century was retail 
credit—but its logic was nearly the mirror image of today. While today credit lending is 
profitable, in the nineteenth century it was anything but. The well fed, prosperous guy 
only sells for cash while the emaciated, nervous guy with the mice sells on credit. 
The picture’s message was clear: we don’t want to lend. Yet its logic of lending, 
like ours today, is grounded in a very particular set of historical circumstances. 
Borrowing is more than numbers, it is a set of relationships between people and 
institutions. More than any graph, this picture, if we can understand it, clarifies the 
differences between then and now—and how debt has changed. 
Shopping every few days for food—generally the largest portion of an 1890 
budget—customers could quickly build up a tab. On payday, wives were supposed to 
stop by and settle the bill. Yet many did not. Grocers charged higher prices for credit 
purchases, but there was no interest—interest would have violated the usury laws. So if 
someone paid every week or didn’t pay for months, it was the same price—and the 
same profit or lack thereof. Shopkeepers could quickly lose money on credit sales 
because the money that they lent was their own. 
Customer credit came out of the grocer’s own pocket. As you can see in the 
picture, the credit lender’s vault is empty while his basket is filled with IOUs. Americans 
didn’t have credit cards. No bank would lend the skinny guy money to finance his 
customers. No third party would buy the debt and try to collect what was owed. Loans 
were not commodities bought and sold as they are today. In our economy, financiers 
figure out ways to get us to borrow and then resell that debt to investors. Debt is 
produced like any other commodity—shoes, steel, computers—for the market. Buyers 
of our debt—whether mortgages, credit cards, or car loans—evaluate it like any other 
investment weighing the return against the risk. And today’s debt is easy to resell. Then, 
consumer debt was business error. That is to say, bankers and entrepreneurs didn’t 
think debt was a good investment. It was not a good use of their scarce, constrained 
capital. Consumer debt was a way to lose money. If we can understand how this grocer 
turned into our retail life today, we can understand how small loans became big 
business. We can understand how creditors became fat. 
Who would invest in this debt? The history of how corner grocers, and all the 
other retailers, began to resell their debt is a complex one spanning the century, from 
the first automobiles to our present financial crisis. While borrowing might be as ancient 
as currency itself, markets for consumer debt are as modern as a bobbed haircut. In the 
1920s, a few different changes in business and law collided to move personal debt from 
the margin of capitalism to its center, taking a position alongside commercial and 
national debt. Usury laws had limited interest rates for centuries, but progressive 
reformers, seeking to provide a profitable alternative to the loan shark, pushed for 
higher rates. As states raised usury limits and institutions began to buy personal debt 
from retailers, debt escaped the personal and became a commodity to be bought and 
sold. Once debt could be sold, it could be invested in. Debt became a place for investors 
to put money, connecting it with the most basic operations of capitalism. 
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